ABSTRACT In this paper, we investigate location-based frequency allocation schemes in a two-layer ultra-dense network (UDN) with a wideband eavesdropper to efficiently enhance the macro layer security in the whole working bandwidth. The cross-tier interference, treated as evil by traditional wisdom, is employed to confuse the malicious node as well as to tackle the conflict between the secrecy and traditional performances through the prudent spectrum allocation among the small cells. Three games are designed to progressively give insight into the frequency assignment problems under increasingly strict scenes. With the help of game theoretic stochastic learning approaches and location information, small cell base stations (SBSs) are endowed with the ability to distributedly select the subchannel with no requirement on the eavesdropper's CSI. First, more specifically, we focus on the security problem, aiming to promote the safety transmission of macro users by leveraging a state field, and thus formulate the spectrum selection of SBSs as a state-based potential game, which guarantees a budget-balanced utility design. The existence of a recurrent state equilibrium point is proved, and that it is able to maximize the total safety transmission probability of all subchannels. A step forward, we take the service delay of SBSs into consideration, nowadays, as numerous new services are delay-sensitive. To this end, an exact potential game, in which the equilibrium always exists, is built to help SBSs strike a balance between altruistically helping the macro users and selfishly keeping their own performances. Furthermore, a fully distributed non-cooperative game that requires no exchange among SBSs is put forward. The proposed scheme may work well even when the backhaul is limited or even unavailable since all the SBSs only depend on the observation of their own instantaneous performances. Finally, the numerical results validate the effectiveness of the proposed games on improving the safety transmission probability while guaranteeing a better service within small cells.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the prevalence of smart phones, tablets and machine type communications, investigations of new technologies have been moving ahead vigorously to provide seamless wireless coverage and extremely high network capacity. Thereinto, the technique of ultra-dense networks (UDNs) serves as a key enabler in meeting the skyrocketed traffic demands due to its distinct advantages on escalating the spectrum reuse as well as lessening the path loss. A classical
The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Zeeshan Kaleem. deployment of UDNs contains a host of densely deployed small cells under the umbrella of a traditional cellular, working on the same band as the macro layer. Plentiful efforts have been made to address the technical challenges brought by its heterogeneous and ultra-dense architecture, such as interference management, green communication and mobility management [1] - [5] . Moreover, subversive effects have been casted on the user behavior in recent years as innovative 5G mobile Internet services seep into all aspect of human life. For instance, users in mounting numbers are accustomed to on-line shopping/gaming and hotel booking where mobile payment will occur, leading to a public concern about the wireless information security since those messages on air are not only closely related to their privacy but their property safety as well. Unfortunately, owing to the open nature of wireless communications, it is susceptible for malicious nodes to overhear the information from legitimate links, especially in UDNs where the network architecture is more open and diverse than that of the conventional single-tier cellular network [6] . Needless to say, secrecy performance should gain more attention in the UDNs research to embrace the new challenge of future communications.
Traditionally, it is the upper layer that takes the responsibility of secure communication by employing the tools of cryptography. However, this heavy-calculation task is highly energy-consuming which is extremely undesirable for today's battery-limited mobile terminals and the key management will be far more difficult as the number of nodes increases [7] . Physical layer security (PLS) is then emerged as a rescuer to offer complementary solutions that are more suitable for wireless operations, and has been widely accepted as a promising technique to improve the overall secrecy performance ever since Wyner's pioneer work [8] . There are mainly two branches in the research of PLS, one of which is performance analyzing. The derivation of secrecy outage probability, connection outage probability or the secrecy probability have been progressed from point to point scenes (Alice and Bob with an eavesdropper) under different channel conditions to multi-node deployments like ad hoc [9] and relay [10] networks. The secrecy performance analysis of a heterogeneous network under certain access or jammer selection strategies have started to appear lately [11] , [12] , in which stochastic geometry plays a vital role in modeling the randomness and heterogeneity of the network.
The other embranchment is the strategy design to effectively elevate the secrecy capacity or lower the secrecy outage probability via careful allocations of all sorts of resources (e.g., time [13] , power [14] , space [15] , jammer/relay selection [16] , etc.). Security scheme in ultra-dense heterogeneous networks is a relatively new area compared with the researches in relay and cognitive scenarios, which experiences more challenges that stem from the complicated network architecture. For example, the multi-tier framework and frequency reuse lead to an intricate interference environment which has always been a big threat to the performance of UDNs, while in the context of PLS interference is deemed as an angel to degrade the wiretap channel. And some dedicated jammers or artificial interference are deliberately added into the network. The conflict between the two perceptions should be reconciled so that the secrecy performance can be enhanced and traditional performances can be guaranteed in the meantime.
Rather than just eliminating, the researchers begin to make use of the cross-tier interference to guard the safety transmission in a multi-tier network like UDN. Reference [17] considers an ultra-dense network with orthogonal subchannels allocated to the two layers, and uses SBSs as jammers to defend macro layer's confidential information. The two-way selection problem between multiple SBSs and multiple macro user equipments (MUEs) is modeled as a coalitional game which can be solved in a distributed manner. In [6] , several beamforming strategies are designed amongst cooperative SBSs and MBSs under both orthogonal and partial orthogonal spectrum allocation scenes, aiming to improve the security of the intended MUE. But the shared spectrum case which has the highest spectrum efficiency and the most severe interference is ignored in above works. The eavesdroppers in [14] are assumed to possess the ability of energy harvesting. The joint collaborative information/energy transmit beamforming and artificial noise design between MBS and SBSs is investigated to maximize the secrecy rate of the wiretapped MUE. However, the schemes proposed by [6] , [14] can be fragile when the eavesdropper is equipped with a wideband receiver and is interested in all MUEs' communication in that only the intended MUE is protected in [6] , [14] . [18] provides a way to address this issue by formulating an optimization problem constrained by each user's secrecy capacity requirement, to optimize the precoding vectors of the MBS and four SBSs so that the power consumption can be minimized. In principle, most studies on PLS in UDNs are built on some predetermined frequency assignment schemes, on the basis of which either power allocation or beamforming, with only the typical subchannel and the group of users on it considered, is performed. However, the spectrum allocation mechanism itself has significant effects on both legitimate and wiretap links, therefore, the system with multiple subchannels should be seen as a whole and the spectrum configuration needs further investigation to fully explore its impact on the secrecy performance [19] .
Game theory is deemed as an efficient tool in recent years to study the interaction among various nodes and to design a distributed framework, which is an urgent demand in UDNs. Among the multifarious game models, potential game is a very useful one that guarantees the existence of an equilibrium. For the sake of the realization of distributed control, there has been a growing interest in stochastic learning that involves the design of decision rules for players to help them adapt to the unknown environment [20] . To better overcome the errors that may arise in learning process, a 'state' or 'mood' field was introduced into the learning mechanism in [21] to indicate the status of the players which contributes to finding out the preferable direction in the experiment. Moreover, a desirable utility function needs to satisfy several conditions including locality of information, tractability and budget balanced to realize a more universal application [22] . However, it is proved that it is impossible for a budget balanced potential game to reach the price of stability (PoS) of 1 [22] . So a state-based game is then introduced in [23] where a state field is brought in the game so that a budget balanced game could achieve the best PoS.
Inspired by this insight, this paper firstly exploits the state-based game to protect the macro layer's secrecy performance on all subchannels in a two-tier UDN, where the small cell layer shares the whole bandwidth with the MBS in order to pursue the maximal frequency reuse. A wideband eavesdropper is there to intercept the MUEs' information, imposing hazard to all legitimate MBS-MUE links. The SBSs in this scenario are considered as altruistic assistances to help the MUEs (or it can be explained as the prerequisite for network access license) and self-organized to select the proper subchannel to effectively disturb the eavesdropper. Then, the selfishness of SBSs is taken into consideration that they have a strong desire to provide better quality of experience (QoE) for their own users, particularly in the face of 5G new services that have a harsh requirement on delay. With the help of max-logit learning and reinforcement learning algorithms, the frequency assignment among the SBSs can be solved in a distributed way. The main contributions of this paper are summarized as follows:
• Burst traffic as well as hybrid automatic repeat request (HARQ) process in media access control (MAC) layer are considered in this work. The derivation of service delay and secrecy probability as well as the algorithm design are all based on the location information, which requires no CSI information on either legitimate or wiretap channels, relieving the SBSs from CSI estimation and feedback.
• The spectrum allocation is studied to promote the information security in UDNs. The cross-tier interference is carefully utilized to deteriorate the eavesdropper's performance which puts all subchannels under the shelter. An ordinal potential game is formulated exploiting the concept of state-based game to maximize the overall secrecy probability of MUEs, the existence of whose recurrent state equilibrium is proved.
• The selfishness of SBSs is considered for a more realistic scenario where the SBSs also concentrate on their own users, attempting to improve the user's quality of experience (QoE). The service delay is also considered to empower the SBSs to better accommodate 5G services. With the purpose of striking the balance between secrecy performance and the service delay, two games are designed for different utilizations. Better performances can be achieved through an exact potential game, which is suitable when there is a favorable backhaul to support the exchanges among SBSs. Additionally, a non-cooperative game with reinforcement learning is also proposed to fit for the case when the backhaul is limited, where the SBSs only need an observation of their own instant utilities and require zero interaction among SBSs. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, the system model is presented including the network setups and delay as well as secrecy performance expressions. Next, the three games are proposed with stochastic learning algorithms as corresponding solutions in Section III. Numerical results validate the effectiveness of the proposed games in Section IV before we conclude this paper in Section V. 
II. SYSTEM MODEL A. NETWORK AND CHANNEL MODEL
We consider a downlink two-tier UDN as shown in Fig. 1 , where an eavesdropper and a number of small cells are randomly deployed in the three sectors of a macro cell. The transmit power of MBS and SBSs are p m and p s , respectively. We assume that the index of MBS is 0 and the eavesdropper is represented by e. Let L = {1, 2, . . . , L} and N = {1, 2, . . . , N } represent the set of L SBSs and the N available frequency resources in the system respectively, where L = |L| and N = |N|. A shared pattern is considered that SBSs are allowed to reuse all the N subchannels and each SBS l is supposed to choose one subchannel with bandwidth W . Let n l denote the subchannel that is allocated to SBS l and the set I n = {l|n l = n, l ∈ L} represents the interference SBSs on subchannel n. An SBS l can serve one or more small cell user equipments (SUEs), denoted as u l , and a time division duplex (TDD) mode is used when there are multiple users in the small cell. Assuming that the operator has a record of basic information of SBSs at their registration, hence the location information of a certain SBS l, (x l , y l ), is something at hand. There are many circumstances in practice that the eavesdropper's location can be acquired as well [24] . For instance, the eavesdropper is a normal user at ordinary times but tries to overhear some paid services [25] or the eavesdropper is not entirely passive as it sometimes needs to report to its superiors. Moreover, with the popularity of location-based social-media applications, there will be more ways to obtain the location information or we can directly measure the eavesdropper's location in terms of time of arrival (TOA) [26] and time difference of arrival (TDOA) [27] . Similarly, the position of the eavesdropper is denote as (x e , y e ).
In this paper, large scale fading as well as small scale fading are presumed when describing the channel gain. And the large scale fading from transmitter i to receiver j can be modeled as [28] . Therefore, the channel gain between i and j on subchannel n can be calculated as
where h n i,j is the small scale fading, the module of which follows the Rayleigh distribution. Hence, the |h n i,j | 2 is exponentially distributed and we assume its parameter is 1. d i,j is the distance between transmitter i and receiver j, which can be easily calculated with the location information 2 . Then the signal to interference plus noise ratio (SINR) of a typical user in SBS k and the eavesdropper on subchannel n can be formulated as
where σ 2 is the power of thermal noise. Suppose that a minimal SINR level is required at the SUE and eavesdropper side in order to correctly decode the received packet, so the failure probability of one transmission on subchannel n can be denoted as P n m = Pr{γ n 0,m < γ m }, P n l = Pr{γ n l,u l < γ s } and P n e = Pr{γ n 0,e < γ e } for MUE m, SBS l and the wiretap link, respectively, where γ m , γ s and γ e are the SINR thresholds for MUEs, SUEs and the eavesdropper.
B. SAFETY MODEL
An MUE is able to safely communicate with MBS only when the quality of the corresponding wiretap channel is so worse that the eavesdropper can not successfully decode the overheard message, implying that the secrecy probability is exactly the failure probability of the eavesdropper. From equation (3), the secrecy probability on subchannel n is given by
which can be further written as 
As for Y , it can be deemed as the sum of a series of exponential variables with parameter ϕ e i = d α i,e /Kp s , the pdf of which is given by [29] as
Then the cumulative distribution function (cdf) of Z = X − Y can be derived as
Therefore, the secrecy probability P n safe actually has the value of F z (σ 2 ). Since σ 2 > 0, we have
Similarly, for legitimate communications between MBS and MUEs, the failure possibility for a one time transmission VOLUME 7, 2019 of MUE m on subchannel n can be calculated as
where
Since the interference is reserved here to some extent in order to refrain the eavesdropper, the hybrid automatic-repeat-request protocol with chase combine (HARQ-CC) is harnessed to relieve the side effect that is inevitably casted on the performances of legitimate links. The retransmitted packet experiences the soft-combined procedure at the destination, leading to a smaller frame error rate which is c (0 < c < 1) times of the original one [30] . And Note that the eavesdropper does not implement such a HARQ procedure in that it has no clue whether a received packet is newly created or just at its retransmission. As a consequence, the final probability that MUE m fails to receive a data packet is
where M is the maximum allowed number of retransmissions at the MAC layer. In this work, we aim to enhance the safety probability P safe on each subchannel while guaranteeing the successful transmission probabilities of MUEs in the system.
C. TRAFFIC MODEL
With the era of mobile Internet around the corner, a vast number of data services have poured into the network, claiming more consideration on the burst traffic. Without loss of generality, an M/D/1 queue model with packet generation rate λ and service rate µ per subchannel is taken into account [31] , [32] . The probability of a failure transmission of an SUE u l on subchannel n has a similar expression to that of the eavesdropper and from (9) we can get
Due to the adoption of the HARQ process, the erroneous data packets will not be removed from the buffer, waiting for the retransmission for up to M times at MAC layer. Consequently, the veritable input traffic λ at SBSs is the aggregation of the fresh data at time t and the stranded packets that haven't been successfully delivered in previous M time slots. Thereby, the expectation of the input traffic at SBS l on subchannel n can be expressed as
Note that the situation that only one SUE exists is considered here for concise expressions of delay analysis, the outcome of which can be easily extended to the scenario where more SUEs exist. Thus the average waiting time can be calculated according to the Little's law [33] 
The principal objective of our work is to find the optimal frequency allocation that maximizes the total secrecy probability on the entire bandwidth so that every MUE is able to enjoy the benefit. Accordingly, the considered problem can be expressed as
where P th is the threshold for MUE's failure probability, and a = {n 1 , n 2 , . . . , n L } is the resource allocation profile of SBSs, remind that n l represents the choice of SBS l in terms of subchannel. The constraint takes the MUEs' performance into consideration, and guarantees that the spectrum allocation doesn't violates the minimum performance requirements of MUEs. We still make a further attempt to balance the secrecy and traditional performances by taking the service delay into account, resulting in a multi-objective problem
However, tremendous obstacles may occur when directly solve P1 and P2 due to their discrete and non-convex characteristics. On top of that, the conventional centralized optimization methods are no longer the first choice in UDNs where the distributed algorithms are more welcomed. Therefore, we resort to the game theoretic tool to discuss the distributed solutions for above objectives.
III. GAME THEORETIC ANALYSIS
In this section, the PLS-oriented spectrum allocation in the small cell layer is studied with three games successively dealing with the secrecy and delay problems in a distributed manner. The framework of the integrated work is shown in Fig. 2 .
A. THE STATE-BASED GAME
Inspired by the notion of 'mood' or 'state' that brings an extra degree of freedom to the utility design and game control [21] , [23] , we take advantage of this additional field to address the problem of spectrum allocation of the small layer provided that the SBSs selflessly help the safety transmission of MUEs. In line with the definition of state-based games put forward in [23] , we denote the game G1 by tuple 
in which the first three items are identical to the three basic elements of a normal game while P : A × X → (X ) is the state transition function where (X ) denotes the set of probability distributions over the state space X . A specific explanation of these game elements are described as follows.
Player set : The SBSs L = {1, 2, . . . , L} in the network. Action set {A i }: The players aim to select the best subchannel that maximize their utilities, hence the action set for a player i is, A i = N.
State X : Define the admissible states X n = {x n 1 , x n 2 , . . . , x n |I n | } ⊂ X as the set of possible orderings for players who pick the subchannel n, where the state x n i describes the priority of a player i on subchannel n, which satisfies the following properties: (i) if a player i ∈ I n , then x n i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , |I n |} or x n i = ∅, (ii) a player i has the highest priority on subchannel n with x n i = 1 and if x n i < x n j , we say that the player i has a higher priority than player j, (iii) no players in I n share the same state value, i.e., x n i = x n j if i = j. State transition function P(a, x): We take a deterministic rule for state transition as put forward in [22] , the core idea of which essentially follows the first in and first out (FIFO) discipline: a player i that newly joins I n at time t has the lowest priority on subchannel n while the ordering of the original players remains unchanged, i.e., x n i (t) = |I n | + 1 and x n j (t) = x n j (t − 1), j ∈ I n , j = i. If a player i leaves I n at time t, then each player behind it moves one step forward with players with higher priority unaffected, i.e., x n j (t) = x n j (t − 1)
In a state-based game, the utility function of every player is not only related to their action profile a, but also the current state x ∈ X . To explicitly define the utility function for each player i, we first introduce the high priority set I n i as
which denotes the players who have a higher priority than player i in I n . Subsequently, the utility function
where a −i represents the configuration of all other players except player i, and P n safe (I n ) is the secrecy probability of MUE on subchannel n, the expression of which is given in (9) . We can see from the definition that the utility of a player i means the incremental marginal contribution it makes based on its priority. Define the welfare W n (I n ) for resource n as its secrecy probability, it can be easily observed that
and that the utility is budget-balanced.
1) EXISTENCE OF EQUILIBRIUM
Define the potential function as
we can have the following claims by first giving the definition of the submodular [20] . Definition 1: An objective function W n is submodular if for any player set S ⊆ T ⊆ and any player i ∈ exists
Proposition 1: The welfare W n of subchannel n satisfies the property of submodular.
Proof: See the Appendix A. Thereafter, the equilibrium property of G1 can be characterized by Theorem 1.
Theorem 1: G1 is an ordinal state based potential game with the state invariant potential function , which always have a recurrent state equilibrium that maximizes the overall secrecy probability of macro layer.
Proof: Let [a, x] be an action state pair where x is an admissible ordering for the strategy profile a. Suppose that a player i unilaterally deviates from its current strategy a i = n to a i = n , triggering changes in both its revenue and the potential function value. The difference between the variance of the potential value and player i's utility can be calculated as
where I n and I n are the cluster of players that work on subchannel n and n before the switch. Since I n i ⊂ I n ⊂ and I n i , I n = ∅, the outcome of (22) is above or equal to zero due to W n 's property of submodular. Therefore, we can get that
which coincides with the first condition in the definition of ordinal state-based potential games [23] . Moreover, the second condition is apparently satisfied as the potential function (a) here is invariant with the state. Thus, the game G1 is an ordinal state-based potential game.
Let A * denote the action profiles at recurrent state equilibrium points, it can be concluded that any action profile a opt ∈ arg max a∈A (a) must belong to A * . Or there will be at least one player i that has the motivation to switch to another action a i for better payoff, i.e., U i (a i , a opt −i , x) − U i (a opt , x) > 0, leading to a larger value for the potential function (a i , a opt −i ) > (a opt ), which conflicts with the assumption that a opt is the optimal action profile that maximizes the potential function. Let X * denotes the recurrent states of the process P(a opt , ·), then by choosing any state x * ∈ X * we can find a recurrent equilibrium point [a opt , x * ]. Since (a) = n∈N W n (a) = n∈N P n safe (I n ), [a opt , x * ] is an equilibrium point that maximizes the overall secrecy probability of macro layer.
2) PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
At the best equilibrium mentioned above, the price of stability (PoS), defined in (24), can reach to 1. While the price of anarchy (PoA), according to [22] , of a state potential game with submodular cluster welfare functions W n is 2.
PoA(G1) = max
The performance index of PoA and PoS is two of the most well-known worst case measures for the efficiency of equilibria, the former of which provides an upper bound of the ratio between the optimal value and the equilibrium [20] . The game with PoA = 2 means that the performance at any equilibrium point is at least 50% of the best performance that can be achieved and PoS = 1 ensures the existence of an equilibrium point which is as efficient as the optimal allocation scheme.
3) STATE-BASED MAX-LOGIT LEARNING ALGORITHM
In the following, we propose a distributed algorithm for players in G1 to effectively solve the game and find the favorable equilibrium. A max-logit learning framework is utilized here and is shown in Algorithm 1. Three steps encompassing user selection, action update and state update are performed in turn in every loop, which helps the players to automatically learn about the network environment and to detect the most advantageous action. The MBS is responsible for notifying the SBSs when an MUE detects an interference level that is above the threshold. And the SBSs will change the selected subchannel accordingly. The convergence and the performance of the proposed game can be characterized by the following proposition. Proposition 2: Under the proposed ordinal state-based potential game G1, the process of max-logit learning
Algorithm 1 State-Based Max-Logit Learning
Initialization: Set the initial time t = 0, each player i ∈ randomly select an action a i (0) ∈ A i that satisfies the constrain in P1, and an arbitrary state x admissible at a(0) is chosen as the initial state x(0). Calculate the initial utility U i (a(0), x(0)) for every player i in the light of (18) . repeat t = t + 1.
Step 1: Randomly select a player i who is allowed to uniformly choose a trial action a i ∈ A i \{a i (t − 1)} for observation at time t while other players remain unchanged, i.e., a −i (t) = a −i (t −
, where p n i (t) means the probability that player i selects the action a i (t) = n, which is determined by the player i's observation on its obtained utility at experiment action a i :
where τ is the smooth factor of learning.
Step 3:
The ensuing state is chosen randomly in accordance with the state transition function P(a(t), x(t)). until for ∀i ∈ , there exists an action probability p n i (t) that is close to 1, i.e., p n i (t) > 0.99.
guarantees that an action state pair [a * , x * ] is stochastically stable if and only if the action profile a * ∈ arg max a∈A (a). Proof: To prove this proposition, we only need to verify the three conditions put forward in Theorem 5 of [34] . To begin with, it can be seen that the FIFO state transition rule satisfies the requirement of aperiodic and irreducible over the state x [22] , [34] . And the condition (ii) that for any player i and action
(a i , a −i ) − (a) follows from the proof of Theorem 1. At last, consider a state x where x n i = |I n | for player i who take the action n, then it is straightforward that for ∀a i ∈ A i , the equation
(a i , a −i ) − (a) holds. Therefore, the three requirements for the game are met and the claim in the proposition 2 is proved.
For computing complexity, within each iteration, the selected player need to calculate the P n safe , which requires (|I n |−1)|I n | multiplications and 3|I n |−4 additions. And in the worst case, when all players work on the same subchannel n, the computational complexity for P n safe (I n ) and P n safe (I n \{i}) is O(L 2 ) which is not high and is suitable for practical implementation.
The state-based max-logit learning empowers the players to distributedly percept the network environment as well as to find out the most profitable strategy that can achieve the optimum value of the overall secrecy probability with no requirement of central schedule. The cost is the extra overhead for priority exchanges among SBSs that work on the same subchannel.
B. THE EXACT POTENTIAL GAME
With the proliferation of video derived services, small videos at the moment have become one of the main sources for entertainment and information retrieval which have a stringent requirement on delay, not to mention the emerging VR and AR services. In a word, service delay is a pivotal issue that cannot be ignored which is closely related to the quality of user experience (QoE), particularly in delay-sensitive data traffics. Hence in this subsection we take delay into consideration to guarantee the performance of the small layer while keeping a relatively high level of secure transmission in macro layer.
To this end, an exact potential game G2 = { , {A i } i∈ , {U i } i∈ } is employed to model the frequency allocation among the SBSs, where and A i are respectively the set of players and their action sets, which has the same domain as that of G1. Before explicitly describing the utility function, we first give the definition of the group welfare of SBSs work on the same subchannel n as
where D n i (I n ) denotes the service delay of player i when it chooses action n and is mathematically given in (14) . From (27) we can observe that the collective welfare show a positive correlation with the secrecy probability on subchannel n while a negative correlation with player i's service delay. Then the utility of each player i is set as its marginal contribution to the group welfare W n , i.e.,
Then we have the following theorem to characterize the features of G2.
Theorem 2:
The game G2 is an exact potential game with potential function (a) = n∈N W n (I n ) which guarantees the existence of a equilibrium point that maximizes the whole network welfare defined by W n .
Proof: Assume that the players are adopting an action profile a where a i = n. When a player i unilaterally changes its current action to a i = n , the changes of player i's revenue and the potential value can be written as
showing that when a player makes a switch on its action, the variation in potential value is exactly the same as the gain in player's payoff. Consequently, G2 is indeed an exact potential game, in which the existence of an equilibrium is always ensured in that any action profile a * ∈ arg max a∈A (a) is an equilibrium [35] .
As is analyzed above that equilibriums must exist in G2, we then develop a stochastic learning approach aiming to reach the best equilibrium point. For this purpose, a maxlogit learning process with heterogeneous exploration rate is developed as shown in algorithm 2. Essentially, instead of uniformly choosing the experimental user, the step 1 is proceeded according to a probability distribution q(t) related to players' instant utilities as in (30) . This heterogeneous exploration rule leads to a larger selection probability for those who get smaller payoffs, the motivation behind which is that the players that have a relatively large utility have less motivation to deviate, and the less a player get the more necessary it shifts the primary action. It is laterly shown that the max-logit learning with heterogeneous exploration rate has a better efficiency than the traditional one with higher convergence speed and learning performance.
The performance of the proposed algorithm 2 in terms of equilibrium selection can be guaranteed as the following theorem.
Theorem 3: Consider any finite n-player potential game with potential function : A → R where all players adhere to max-logit learning with heterogeneous exploration rates. The stochastically stable states are the set of potential maximizers, i.e., a * = arg max a∈A (a). Proof: See the Appendix B. By Theorem 3, we can draw that the algorithm 2 is capable of finding the ideal equilibriums that optimize the network welfare.
The computation complexity in each iteration mainly lies in calculating the group welfare W n (I n ), which induces
2 +5)|I n | multiplies and 6|I n | 2 +(M −6)× |I n |−1 additions. Therefore, in the worst case when all players choose the same subchannel, the computational complexity is O(L 3 ). And through the simulation, it can be demonstrated that the algorithm doesn't take massive iterations to converge. Hence, the proposed algorithm is feasible for practical use.
C. REINFORCEMENT LEARNING APPROACH
In practice, the implement of the previous two potential games, to some extent, requires the communication among the players within the same cluster, e.g., the exchange of VOLUME 7, 2019
Algorithm 2 Max-Logit Learning With Heterogeneous Exploration Rate
Initialization: Set the initial time t = 0, randomly select an action profile a(0) that satisfies the constraint in P2 and calculates its original utility U i (a(0)). repeat t = t + 1.
Step 1: Select a player i according to the probability distribution q(t) defined in (30) .
where U min = min i∈ U i (a(t − 1)) is the payoff of the worst player and ζ is a small positive number to ensure a non-zero denominator. The selected player is allowed to uniformly choose a trial action a i ∈ A i \{a i (t − 1)} for observation at time t while other players remain unchanged, i.e., a −i (t) = a −i (t − 1).
if a i violates the constraint in P1 the player chooses another trial action if no available action (i.e., all actions in A i \{a i (t − 1)} violates the constraint)
then a i remains unchanged.
Step 2:
The selected player i updates its action a i (t) according to the strategy p i (t) = {p 1 i (t), p 2 i (t), . . . , p N i (t)} ∈ (A i ), where p n i (t) is determined by the max-logit rule. Similar to (26) , the value of p n i (t) can be computed as
where τ is the smooth factor of learning. until for ∀i ∈ , there exists an action probability p n i (t) that is close to 1, i.e., p n i (t) > 0.99.
state information in G1 and the confirmation of coordinate players (the players using the same subchannel) in G2, which raises a relatively high demand on the quality of the backhaul. However, there are many times that the SBSs are coordinating through the wireless backhaul which has a limited capacity and may likely to experience the deep fading every now and then. As a result, the interaction among SBSs may not be smoothly carried out when the backhaul is limited. In this context, we develop a non-cooperative game G3 with reinforcement learning to achieve a totally distributed mechanism so that both the security and delay performance of the system can be enhanced.
For this purpose, we abandon the idea of marginal contribution which leads to the coupling among the players and define the utility function in a more direct way. The utility of a player i who takes the action a i = n can be calculated as
where 1 {condition} has the value 1 if the condition is met, or the value vice versa. In this way, the new game can be denoted as G3 = { , {A i } i∈ , {U i } i∈ }. Let (A i ) represents the mixed strategy space of the player i and a specific strategy is denoted by the vector
, where π n i is actually the probability of the player i adopting the subchannel n.
Without coordination or information exchange, a player gets no information about other competitors. To complete the game with such little local information, the framework of two-timescale reinforcement learning [36] is employed, enabling the players to play the game on their own historical revenues. In algorithm 3, the players simultaneously update their actions according to the mixed strategy π, which is determined by the estimated utility vector according to the historical information and the newly observed payoff u i . Note that the estimated utility vector for player i at time t is denoted by u i (t) = {u 1 i (t), u 2 i (t), . . . , u N i (t)}, in which the element u n i (t) means the utility of player i when it takes the action n at time t. The essence of the learning algorithm is to explore the environment and perform the best action that brings the maximum payoff. However, since the user can only choose one action at a time, only one goal of the two can be met. Therefore, striking the balance between exploring the environment and exploiting the knowledge accumulated through exploration is a significant task which is controlled by the learning factor τ .
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section,we validate the proposed game-based PLS-oriented frequency allocation schemes in a dense urban scenario. Without loss of generality, a 120 • (from −60 • to 60 • ) sector of the macro cell underlaid with a number of small cells, each with one active SUE, are considered. Assume that the MBS is installed at the original point and there is an eavesdropper located at (200,0). The three sectors of the macro cell have an equal share of the total bandwidth of the system, which is set to be 5M and the bandwidth of a subchannel W is 180kHz. The maximum transmit power of an MBS is 40dBm which is uniformly distributed among all subchannels while SBSs serve their SUEs at a power level of 23dBm. Furthermore, the SINR thresholds for SUEs and the eavesdropper are 10dB and 3dB, respectively while the power of white noise is −174dBm/Hz. Other primary parameters involved in the simulation are summarized in table 1.
Before delving into the performance analysis, we begin with the convergence behavior of the three games and their performance gap between the corresponding best Step 1: Every player i firstly updates their estimated utility vector according to the instantaneous performance u i and the current action following the reinforcement rule
where 1 {condition} equals 1 if the condition is true and is 0 otherwise.
Step 2: Then the mixed strategy vector π i for every player i is updated
where β i (u i (t)) is the smoothed best response vector, and is defined as
. Note that θ 1 (t) and θ 2 (t) are parameters of the two coupled reinforcement learning processes and have the following constraints
Every player i simultaneously update the action a i (t) according to the strategy π i (t). until convergence. equilibriums, as is shown in Fig. 3 . In view of this, we assume a relatively small scaled network with N = 4 subchannels and L = 8 SBSs randomly deployed in the sector. Note that we still use 'potential value' to depict the sum of players' utilities in G3 since it is mathematically the same as the potential function (a) of G2, though there is originally no potential value for G3. From Fig. 3 it can be observed that it is viable to utilize the max-logit learning in G1 and G2 to optimize the network welfare, which is able to converge within several dozens of iterations. By contrast, G3 has a relatively inferior property regarding to convergence behavior. Besides, it is almost impossible for G3 to reach the best equilibrium of a certain game due the lack of information of the surroundings. In this case, there is a 7% disparity between the outcome of G3 and the optimal value. In addition, we also study the performance difference between learning process with heterogeneous and homogeneous exploration rates in G2, where the homogeneous exploration rate refers to the condition that all the players have the equal probability of being selected in step 1. We can see in Fig. 3 that both curves could achieve the best potential value yet the max-logit learning with heterogeneous exploration rate has a higher convergence speed for the reason that it always tends to select the user in need and thus leading to a higher efficiency.
In order to study the scalability of the proposed PLS-oriented frequency allocation mechanisms, Fig. 4 illustrates the achieved potential value of the three games versus the number of SBSs in the network, where an evident increase in potential value can be perceived with the growing number of SBSs. The network performance before (at the initial state of the game) and after each game is illustrated in Fig. 4 to reveal the effectiveness of the proposed algorithms, in which we can see an apparent gain in total secrecy probability in G1 and the overall network welfare in G2 and G3. Still, G2 outperforms G3 and there is a slight enlargement of the gap between them as the SBS number increases. This indicates that the loss of performance in G3 is magnified by the growing network due to the fact that more environment information is missed as players only depend on the knowledge of themselves. Hence, we highly recommend the first two games so long as the communication or some level of coordination among SBSs can be realized and deem the G3 as an emergence measure when the backhaul is limited. But it can still guarantee a 12.5% to 24.34% gain compared with the initial potential value. It is worth noting that for G1 a slower growth appears as the network gets denser, the reason for which is that the eavesdropper suffers stronger and stronger interference as more SBSs come into the network. However, there exists an upper bound of the potential value, which happens when all subchannels is absolutely secure, i.e., the secrecy probability is one on every subchannel. Therefore, the potential value of G1 cannot experience a forever increase and will be inevitably decelerated when the secrecy probability reach a certain degree. Hence we can draw the conclusion that there is little significance unlimitedly expanding the network density in the perspective of enhancing the communication safety. The contribution of subsequent small cells declines with the growth of existing SBSs, which is exactly consistent with the physical meaning of 'submodular', and the curve in Fig. 4-(a) gives a visualization of this property.
Then we move on to investigate the secrecy performance of the network. We first study the average secrecy probability on each subchannel versus the number of SBSs in the system, as shown in Fig. 5 , from which it can be seen that G1 outperforms the other two, and still has a remarkable enhancement of the average secrecy probability when there are only a small number of SBSs. In Fig. 5 , we can also clearly observe the submodular feature of this state-based potential game. G2 and G3 start from a relatively low point, the reason of which may lies in that the two games do not go to all lengths to improve the secrecy performance since they have to consider the delay in the mean time. Furthermore, the interference that can be exploited to jam the eavesdropper is inherently limited when there's only a small number of SBSs, hence G2 and G3 are not able to significantly improve the safety performance of the MUEs in such scenarios. But as the number of SBSs increases, the two games begin to function well and G2 can reach the level that is very close to G1. Fig. 6 exhibits the cdf curves of secrecy probability of the three games when there are 30 SBSs installed. Not surprisingly, the state-based game exceeds the other two since it primarily focuses on the secrecy performance, which effectively eliminated the lowsecurity subchannel. From Fig. 6 it can be observed that the number of MUEs with high risks of being overheard is almost one sixth of that in the initial stage. The MUEs with average secrecy probability less than 0.9 has decreased from around 48% to 25% through the state-based max-logit learning of G1. G2 also performs well with regard to improving the secrecy probability, insecure users (refer to those whose secrecy probability under 0.9) are cut down by one third compared with that of the initial case.
The service delay is presented in Fig. 7 , in which the experienced service delay of three algorithms are normalized by the latency in the initial status and thus directly illustrates the ratio between the performances before and after the games. By integrating the delay into utility function, the delay in game 2 and game 3 reduce to a level that is forty to sixty percent of the original delay. This prominent gain of service delay in G2 and G3 is at the sacrifice of the secrecy performance confronted with G1. Notice that there is a subtle increase of relative time delay versus the number of SBSs in that the growing SBSs induces a more severe co-tier interference which restrains the algorithms' performances. What's more, it can be discovered that G1 yields a service latency that is around 80% of what in the initial stage, implying that the first game can achieve an excellent performance on information security and slightly improve the experienced latency although it does not explicitly take the delay into consideration. This is due to the submodular property of W n (a) that the improvement of secrecy probability slows down as SBSs in mounting numbers work on one subchannel. Therefore, it will be more profitable to disperse SBSs among all channels rather than to have too many SBSs assemble on few frequencies. As a result, G1 would not incur massive interference among SBSs and therefore keep the delay at the same level of the original latency. Fig. 8 illustrates the change of secrecy probability when eavesdropper locates at different positions. It clearly shows that G1 has a remarkable advantage over the other two games especially when eavesdropper stays at the near center of the macro cell, attaining a 24.3% gain in secrecy probability. The gain brought by the three algorithms on the secrecy probability climbs fast when d o,e < 200 since the wiretap channel experiences a weaker attenuation, leaving the legitimate users in a highly dangerous situation. This gives a larger space for the three schemes to lift the secrecy probability. With the eavesdropper moving outward, the obtained gain decreases as the eavesdropper has less ability to overhear, and the original secrecy probability also rises. G3 has a relatively inferior performance since the players almost make their decision in blind and requires no extra information about the network.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have investigated PLS-oriented spectrum allocation schemes in heterogeneous ultra-dense networks with a wideband eavesdropper exploiting game theoretic approaches, where SBSs are deemed as players who compete with the limited frequency resource to maximize their own utilities. Firstly, the altruistic SBSs are considered whose aim is to help the secure information transmission of the macro layer and a stated-based potential game is formulated with a budget-balanced utility function. The state-based max-logit learning process is proved to find the recurrent equilibrium of the game, and is shown to effectively improve the average secrecy probability on each subchannel without harm to SBSs' delay performances. Next, the delay performance of SBSs is also considered since the basic role of SBSs is to better service their SUEs. To this end, an exact potential game is designed solved by the algorithm of max-logit learning with heterogeneous exploration rate, through which the optimal equilibrium can be found. Furthermore, a fully distributed non-cooperative game with the two-timescale reinforcement learning algorithm is proposed to deal with the condition when information exchanges among the SBSs are unavailable. By taking delay into consideration, the SBSs are able to select the favorable subchannel that both the secrecy and delay performance can be enhanced. Before the demonstration of Proposition 1 is given, we begin with proving the following sequence of lemmas.
Proof: By exploiting the mathematical induction method, the proof that Lemma 1 holds for every natural number r proceeds as follows.
Basis: When r = 3, we have
So it is obviously that the lemma is true for r = 3. Inductive step: Assume that the lemma holds for r = q, q 3, that is
by successively utilizing the inductive hypothesis, it can be observed from (37) that Lemma 1 indeed holds for every natural number r > 3.
Since both the basis and the inductive step have been performed, by mathematical induction, the statement in Lemma 1 is proved to be true for all the numbers larger than or equal to 3.
Lemma 2:
Proof: Basis: In case that r = 2, it can be derived that
hence the Lemma 2 holds for r = 2. Inductive step: Assume that Lemma 2 holds when r = q, q 2, i.e.,
. Then the left hand of Lemma 2 at r = q + 1 can be written as
By substituting the inductive hypothesis and Lemma 1 into (39), we have
which shows that Lemma 2 holds when r = q + 1 and therefore completes the proof. We then move on to the demonstration of Proposition 1 by considering the group of players S that selects the same action n and a typical player i in S.
I. When |S| = 1, i.e., S = {i}, the utility of player i can be expressed as
where W n (∅) represents the natural secrecy probability of the MUE on subchannel n with no SBS's help. In this context, the secrecy probability on subchannel n can be calculated as follows 
where, as is previously analyzed, the random variable z = Kp m d a 0,e γ e |h 0,e | 2 is actually follows the exponential distribution with parameter φ = d a 0,e γ e /Kp m . Consequently, the cdf of natural secrecy probability is
From (9) 
implying that {b n } is a decreasing sequence of numbers. By exploiting the (44), (45) and Lemma 2, we find the relationship between the value of W n (S) and the sequence {b n }: 
Therefore, for ∀S ⊆ T ⊆ , S, T = ∅, let |S| = n 1 and |T | = n 2 , it is obvious that n 1 n 2 . Hence we can see that [W n (S) − W n (S\{i})] − [W n (T ) − W n (T \{i})] = e −φσ 2 ϕ i (a n 1 − a n 2 ) ≥ 0, (48) which is consistent with the definition of submodular. 
APPENDIX B PROOF OF THEOREM 3
We begin the proof of Theorem 3 with the following lemma. Lemma 3: Max-logit learning with heterogeneous exploration rate produces a regular perturbed Markov process where the unperturbed Markov process is an asynchronous best reply process and the resistance R of any feasible transition a → a = (a i , a −i ) is
Proof: Since any player's action set is complete in algorithm 2, i.e., the available action set for a player i when it employs the action a i is A i for all a i ∈ A i , the Assumption 5.1 in [35] is met. From the assumption therein it can be concluded that the max-logit learning process produce a finite, aperiodic, irreducible process over the state space A. Hence, let = e − 1 τ and P denote the associated probability transition matrix. The transition probability from a to a contains two elements: the probability of selecting the player i and the probability of player i selecting the action a i .
where q i denotes the probability that player i is selected at step 1 in learning process and is given in (30) . Then define U max = max(U i (a), U i (a )) and multiply the numerator and denominator of (50) by U max , we can get
Consequently,
which indicates that the process P is a regular perturbed Markov process whose resistance of transition a → a is
Similar to the Lemma 3.2 of [35] , for any feasible action path of any player i: Path = {a 1 → a 2 → . . . → a t }, there exist a reverse path Path = {a t → a t−1 → . . . → a 1 } due to the complete characteristic of action set A i . The difference in the resistance across the two path is R(Path) − R(Path ) = (a 1 ) − (a t ).
Take the resistance tree T * rooted at a * = arg max a∈A (a) into consideration and let a be any other action profile a ∈ A\{a * }, there must be a path Path from a to a * (from Assumption 5.1 in [35] ) and a reverse path Path . The new resistance tree T rooted at a can be obtained through combining the tree T * and the reverse Path from a * to a and then removing the redundant edges Path. Hence the resistance of the new tree T can be derived as
from which we can observe that it is impossible to construct a minimum resistance tree rooted at the action profile that does not optimize the potential function. As a result, when all players in G2 adhere to max-logit learning with heterogeneous exploration rate, the stochastically stable states are the set of potential maximizers a * .
